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1 members (Russ Tanner),
8,858
guests, and
97
robots. |
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Key:
Admin,
Global Mod,
Mod
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Joined: May 2009
Posts: 13,370
Founder Master Elite Member
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I.Gun Laws 1
II.Right to refuse to
give
your name 2
III.codes, rules, laws
and
regulations versus our rights under the constitution 2
IV.General cases for
supporting our constitutional rights 3
V.Definition of a
crime
(must be an injured party) 3
VI.Can’t be fined or
penalized for exercising constitutional rights 3
VII.14th Amendment 3
VIII.18 U.S.C.
(deprivation
of rights) 3
IX.Right to Travel 4
X.Legality of Traffic
Stop 5
XI.Searches 5
XII.Licenses 6
XIII.Traffic Tickets 7
XIV.Detainment /
Arrest 7
XV.Self Defense /
Resisting
Arrest / Helping others who are being arrested 8
XVI.Being detained
/Seizures
of a “person” 9
XVII.Color of Law
abuses 9
XVIII.Taking of
property 9
XIX.Contracts 9
XX.Ignorance of the
law (or
claiming thereof by a public offical) 9
XXI.Being a witness
against
yourself 5th Amendment 10
XXII.Definition of
consumer
goods versus equipment 10
XXIII.Protectiong
property 11
XXIV.Public Officials
over
reaching their “power” 11
XXV.Judges acting
outside
their jurisdiction 12
XXVI.Jurisdiction 13
XXVII.Juvenile Rights
13
XXVIII.Infringing on
constitutional rights 13
-
Gun
Laws
-
As for grounds for arrest: “The carrying
of arms in a quiet, peaceable, and orderly manner,
concealed on or about the person, is not a breach of
the peace. Nor does such an act of itself, lead to a
breach of the peace.” (Wharton’s Criminal and Civil
Procedure, 12th Ed., Vol.2: Judy v. Lashley, 5 W.
Va. 628, 41 S.E. 197)
-
"The mere presence of firearms does not
create exigent circumstances." WI v. Kiekhefer, 212
Wis. 2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-2052.
-
Right
to refuse to give your name
-
"No law allows officers to
arrest for obstruction on a person’s refusal to
give his or her name. Mere silence is insufficient
to constitute obstruction". Henes v. Morrissey,
194 Wis. 2d 339, 533 N.W.2d 802 (1995).
-
"You can, and must, keep your
mouth shut for protection under the Fifth
Amendment." Belnap v US, Et al, District Court
(Utah), No C. 149-71.
-
codes,
rules, laws and regulations versus our rights
under the constitution
-
"Where rights secured by the
Constitution are involved, there can be no rule
making or legislation which would abrogate them."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491. Reply With
Quote
-
The Supreme Court of the United States
of America has determined, "All codes, rules, and
regulations are for government authorities only, not
human/Creators in accordance with God's laws. All
codes, rules, and regulations are unconstitutional
and lacking due process…" Rodriques v. Ray Donavan
(U.S. Department of Labor) 769 F. 2d 1344, 1348
(1985).
-
"There, every man is independent of all
laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not
bound by any institutions formed by his fellowman
without his consent." [Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338
(1796) 2 S.E.]
-
"Statutes that violate the plain and
obvious principles of common right and common reason
are null and void." Bennett v. Boggs, 1 Baldw 60.
-
"Any law that is repugnant to the
constitution is null and void of law." Marbury v
Madison, 5 US 137
-
"The assertion of federal rights, when
plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated
under the name of local practice." Davis v.
Wechsler, 263 US 22, at 24
-
"Where rights secured by the
Constitution are involved, there can be no rule
making or legislation which would abrogate them."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491.
-
"The State cannot diminish rights of the
people." Hertado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
-
Bonnett v. Vallier Unconstitutional
Statutes The general rule is that an
unconstitutional statute, though having the form and
name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly
void and ineffective for any purpose, since its
unconstitutionality dates from the time of its
enactment... In legal contemplation, it is as
inoperative as if it had never been passed... Since
an unconstitutional law is void, the general
principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers
no right, creates no office, bestows no power or
authority on anyone, affords no protection and
justifies no acts performed under it... A void act
cannot be legally consistent with a valid one. An
unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede any
existing law. Indeed insofar as a statute runs
counter to the fundamental law of the land, (the
Constitution) it is superseded thereby. No one is
bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts
are bound to enforce it." Bonnett v. Vallier, 116
N.W. 885, 136 Wis. 193 (1908); NORTON v. SHELBY
COUNTY, 118 U.S. 425 (1886)
-
"Any law which would place the keeping
and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a
conservator of the peace, unless for some breach of
the peace committed in his presence, or upon
suspicion of felony, would be most oppressive and
unjust, and destroy all the rights which our
Constitution guarantees." Pinkerton v Verberg, 78
Mich 573, 584; 44 NW 579, 582-583 (1889).
-
General
cases for supporting our constitutional rights
-
"Constitutions are not primarily
designed to protect majorities, who are usually able
to protect themselves, but rather to preserve and
protect the rights of individuals and minorities
against arbitrary action of those in authority."
Houston County v. Martin, 232 A 1 511; 169 So. 13.
-
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) "In
essence the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the
merits of the dispute or of particular issues.
Standing doctrine embraces... the general
prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's
legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of
generalized grievances more appropriately addressed
in the representative branches, and the requirement
that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked. The
requirement of standing, however, has a core
component derived directly from the Constitution. A
plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
traceable to defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."
-
"Under our system of government upon the
individuality and intelligence of the citizen, the
state does not claim to control him/her, except as
his/her conduct to others, leaving him/her the sole
judge as to all that affects himself/herself."
Mugler v. Kansas 123 U.S. 623, 659-60.
-
Definition
of a crime (must be an injured party)
-
"For a crime to exist, there must be an
injured party. There can be no sanction or penalty
imposed upon one because of this exercise of
Constitutional rights."- Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.
945.
-
Can’t
be fined or penalized for exercising
constitutional rights
-
"There can be no sanction or penalty
imposed upon one because of this exercise of
constitutional rights." Sherer v. Cullen, 481 F 946
-
"A State may not impose a charge for the
enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal
Constitution." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, at 113.
-
"The Claim and exercise of a
Constitutional Right cannot be converted into a
crime."-Miller v. U.S. , 230 F 2d 486. 489
-
"If the state converts a liberty into a
privilege the citizen can engage in the right with
impunity" Shuttlesworth v Birmingham , 373 USs 262
(also categorized under right to travel)
-
14th
Amendment
-
Case law shows that the "liberty"
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment extends beyond
freedom from bodily restraint and includes a much
wider range of human activity, including but not
limited to the opportunity to make a wide range of
personal decisions concerning one's life, family,
and private pursuits. See Meyer v, 262 US 390, 399;
43 SCt 625, 626; 67 L Ed 1043 (1923), and Roe v
Wade, 410 US 113, 152-153; 93 S Ct 705, 726-727; 35
L Ed 2d 147 (1973). One of these life, family,
private pursuits is obviously driving.
-
18
U.S.C. (deprivation of rights)
-
Conspiracy Against Rights, 18 U.S.C. §
241. Section 241 makes it unlawful for two or more
persons to agree together to injure, threaten, or
intimidate a person in any state, territory or
district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him/her by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or
because of his/her having exercised the same).
Unlike most conspiracy statutes, Section 241 does
not require that one of the conspirators commit an
overt act prior to the conspiracy becoming a crime.
-
Deprivation of Rights Under Color of
Law, 18 U.S.C. § 242. This provision makes it a
crime for a person acting under color of any law to
willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.
-
For the purpose of Section 242, acts
under "color of law" include acts not only done by
federal, state, or local officials within the their
lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the
bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the
acts are done while the official is purporting to or
pretending to act in the performance of his/her
official duties.
-
Right
to Travel
-
"We are all citizens of the United
States, and as members of the same community must
have the right to pass and repass through every part
of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
States.”Crandall v. Nevada (73 U. S. 35)
-
Right to Travel: Whether armed or not
"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public
highways and to transport his property thereon,
either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere
privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at
will, but a common right which he has under the
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness."- Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579
-
"Undoubtedly the right of locomotion,
the right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination, is an attribute of
personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free
transit from or through the territory of any State
is a right secured by the l4th Amendment and by
other provisions of the Constitution." - Schactman v
Dulles, 96 App D.C. 287, 293.
-
It is settled that the streets of a city
belong to the people of a state and the use thereof
is an inalienable right of every citizen of the
state. Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App.
534, 547, 224 Pac. 1008, 1013 (1924); Escobedo v.
State Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1950), 222 Pac. 2d 1,
5, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950).
-
This right of the people to the use of
the public streets of a city is so well established
and so universally recognized in this country, that
it has become a part of the alphabet of fundamental
rights of the citizen. Swift v. City of Topeka, 23
Pac. 1075,1076, 43 Kansas 671, 674.
-
"Complete freedom of the highways is so
old and well established a blessing that we have
forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll
roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily
administered, the highways may be completely
monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the
people submit, then they may look to see the most
sacred of their liberties taken from them one by
one, by more or less rapid encroachment." Robertson
vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147.
-
Public ways, as applied to ways by land,
are usually termed “highways” or “public roads,” are
such ways as every citizen has a right to use. Kripp
v. Curtis, 11 P. 879; 71 Cal. 62
-
Every citizen has an inalienable right
to make use of the public highways of the state;
every citizen has full freedom to travel from place
to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty.
People v Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180, 182 (Colo.-1961).
-
Americans' "freedom to travel throughout
the United States has long been recognized as a
basic right under the Constitution," according to
multiple cases including Williams v Fears, 179 US
270, 274; 21 S Ct 128; 45 L Ed 186 (1900); Twining v
New Jersey, 211 US 78, 97; 29 S Ct 14; 53 L Ed 97
(1908), as listed in the case of United States v
Guest, 383 US 745; 86 S Ct 1170; 16 L Ed 2d 239
(1968), a case involving criminally prosecuting
people for obstructing the right (obstruction is a
federal crime pursuant to federal criminal law 18
USC 241).
-
Colorado Article 42-2-101 clearly
states, licensing is for commercial drivers, not
private citizens.. "...For while a citizen has the
right to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, that right does not
extend to the use of the highways...as a place for
private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has
a vested right to use the highways of this state,
but it is a privilege...which the (state) may grant
or withhold at its discretion..." State v. Johnson,
245 P 1073.
-
"The right to travel is part of the
Liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment." Kent v. Dulles 357 U.S. 116, 125.
Reaffirmed in Zemel v. Rusk 33 US 1.
-
"Where activities or enjoyment, natural
and often necessary to the well being of an American
citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will
construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail
or dilute them... to repeat, we deal here with a
constitutional right of the citizen..." Edwards v.
California 314 US 160 (1941).
-
"Even the legislature has no power to
deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the
highway and transport his property in the ordinary
course of his business or pleasure, though this
right may be regulated in accordance with the public
interest and convenience. - Chicago Motor Coach v
Chicago, 169 NE 22 ("Regulated" here means stop
lights, signs, etc. NOT a privilege that requires
permission or unconstitutional taxation; i.e. -
licensing, mandatory insurance, vehicle
registration, etc., requiring financial
consideration, which are more illegal taxes.)
-
"The right of the citizen to travel upon
the public highways and to transport his property
thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not
a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit
at will, but a common right which he has under the
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness."- Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579.
-
"The right to travel is protected by the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment."
"Right to travel is constitutionally protected
against private as well as public encroachment."
Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. V. Operation Rescue,
948 F2d 218; International Org. Of Masters, Etc. V.
Andrews, 831, F2d 843; Zobel v. Williams, 457 US 55,
102 Sct. 2309.
-
"License: In the law of contracts, is a
permission, accorded by a competent authority,
conferring the right to do some act which without
such authorization would be illegal, or would be a
trespass or tort." Blacks Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed.
(1910).
-
"If the state converts a liberty into a
privilege the citizen can engage in the right with
impunity" Shuttlesworth v Birmingham , 373 USs 262
-
Legality
of Traffic Stop
-
"Stopping a car for no other reason than
to check the license and registration was
unreasonable under the 4th amendment." Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
-
Searches
-
Refusal to consent to a search does not
provide reasonable suspicion to justify a stop or
continued detention. United States v.
Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 435 n.32 (5th Cir.
2001) (citing United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d
1345, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t would make a
mockery of the reasonable suspicion and probable
cause requirements ... if citizens’ insistence that
searches and seizures be conducted in conformity
with constitutional norms could create the suspicion
or cause that renders their consent unnecessary.”))
-
The Supreme Court makes a clear line and
definition of an unreasonable search In the 2001
case of Kyllo v. United States, Scalia wrote the
Court's opinion in a 5-4 decision that cut across
ideological line.[91] That decision found thermal
imaging of a home to be an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment. Quotes: “A search is a search,
even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable.” Supreme Court Judge Antonin
Scalia "Those of us who are public officials and are
entrusted with the power of the state are ultimately
accountable to the public. When we exercise that
power in public fora, we should not expect our
actions to be shielded from public observation. 'Sed
quis custodiet ipsos cutodes' ("Who watches the
watchmen?”)." -Circuit Court Judge Emory A. Plitt Jr
-
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___ (2009) The
Supreme Court held that police may search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a
recent occupant’s arrest only if it is reasonable to
believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle
at the time of the search or that the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest.
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files...rizona-v-gant/
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-542.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arizona_v._Gant
-
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) The Court reasoned that searches "incident to
arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate
control of the suspect. While police could
reasonably search and seize evidence on or around
the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from
rummaging through the entire house without a search
warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of
warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks
against government abuse.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape... And the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items
must, of course, be governed by a like rule. There
is no comparable justification, however, for
routinely searching any room other than that in
which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for
searching through all the desk drawers or other
closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
Justice Stewart, delivering the opinion of the Court
http://supreme.justia.com/us/395/752/case.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chimel_v._California
Reply With Quote
-
Licenses
-
"License: In the law of contracts, is a
permission, accorded by a competent authority,
conferring the right to do some act which without
such authorization would be illegal, or would be a
trespass or tort." Blacks Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed.
(1910).
-
"The license means to confer on a person
the right to do something which otherwise he would
not have the right to do." City of Louisville v.
Sebree, 214 S.W. 2D 248; 308 Ky. 420.
-
"The object of a license is to confer a
right or power which does not exist without it."
Pavne v. Massev, 196 S.W. 2D 493; 145 Tex. 273;
Shuman v. City of Ft. Wayne, 127 Indiana 109; 26 NE
560, 561 (1891); 194 So 569 (1940).
-
"A license is a mere permit to do
something that without it would be unlawful."
Littleton v. Buress, 82 P. 864, 866; 14 Wyo.173.
-
"A license, pure and simple, is a mere
personal privilege...River Development Corp. V.
Liberty Corp., 133 A. 2d 373, 385; 45 N.J. Super.
445.
-
"A license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state or municipal granting it and the
person to whom it is granted..."American States
Water Services Co. Of Calif. V. Johnson, 88 P.2d
770, 774; 31 Cal. App.2d 606.
-
"A license when granting a privilege,
may not, as the terms to its possession, impose
conditions which require the abandonment of
constitutional rights." Frost Trucking Co. V.
Railroad Commission, 271 US 583, 589 (1924); Terral
v. Burke Construction Company, 257 US 529, 532
(1922).
-
"It is clear that a license relates to
qualifications to engage in profession, business,
trade or calling; thus when merely traveling without
compensation or profit, outside of business
enterprise or adventure with the corporate state, no
license is required of the natural individual
traveling for personal business, pleasure and
transportation." Wingfield v. Fielder (1972) 29 CA3d
213.
-
"The acceptance of a license, in
whatever form, will not impose upon the licensee an
obligation to respect or to comply with any
provision of the statute or with the regulations
prescribed that are repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States." W. W. CARGILL CO. v. STATE OF
MINNESOTA, 180 U.S. 452 (1901) 180 U.S. 452
-
"The word privilege is defined as a
particular benefit, favor, or advantage, a right or
immunity not enjoyed by all, or it may be enjoyed
only under special conditions." Knoll Gold Club v.
U.S., 179 Fed Supp. 377, 380. "...those things which
are considered as inalienable rights which all
citizens possess cannot be licensed since those acts
are not held to be a privilege." City of Chicago v.
Collins, 51 N.E. 907, 910
-
Traffic
Tickets
-
In effect, as per the Supreme Court
decision in the case of Crandall v Nevada, 73 US 35;
18 L Ed (1867), speed limits and other traffic
control devices, being non-fact-based, are simply an
unlawful tax or impost on travel, and thus
unconstitutional for the reason cited in Crandall.
(Crandall involved a tax on travelers! which is what
in essence speed limits, unscientific stop signs,
etc., simply are, stripped of all the phony
fraudulent politician folderol pretending them to
relate somehow to safety, not to mention that are
extortion violating the federal anti-racketeering
act (RICO), 18 USC 1961 and the law against
obstructing federal rights, 18 USC 241).
-
Detainment
/ Arrest
-
"Where an individual is detained,
without a warrant and without having committed a
crime (traffic infractions are not crimes), the
detention is a false arrest and false imprisonment."
Damages Awarded: Trezevant v. City of Tampa, 241
F2d. 336 (11th CIR 1984)
-
Right of Defense Against Unlawful Arrest
“Citizens may resist unlawful arrest to the point of
taking an arresting officer's life if necessary.”
Plummer v. State, 136 Ind. 306. This premise was
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case: John Bad Elk v. U.S., 177 U.S. 529. The
Court stated: “Where the officer is killed in the
course of the disorder which naturally accompanies
an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks
with very different eyes upon the transaction, when
the officer had the right to make the arrest, from
what it does if the officer had no right. What may
be murder in the first case might be nothing more
than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might
show that no offense had been committed.”
-
“An arrest made with a defective warrant,
or one issued without affidavit, or one that fails
to allege a crime is within jurisdiction, and one
who is being arrested, may resist arrest and break
away. lf the arresting officer is killed by one who
is so resisting, the killing will be no more than an
involuntary manslaughter.” Housh v. People, 75 111.
491; reaffirmed and quoted in State v. Leach, 7
Conn. 452; State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245; Ballard v.
State, 43 Ohio 349; State v Rousseau, 241 P. 2d 447;
State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 3621.
-
“An illegal arrest is an assault and
battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of
his liberty has the same right to use force in
defending himself as he would in repelling any other
assault and battery.” (State v. Robinson, 145 ME.
77, 72 ATL. 260).
-
“An illegal arrest is an assault and
battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of
his liberty has the same right to use force in
defending himself as he would in repelling any other
assault and battery.” (State v. Robinson, 145 ME.
77, 72 ATL. 260).
-
A person has been "seized" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave, and as long as the person to whom
questions are put remains free to disregard the
questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion
upon that person's liberty or privacy as would
require some particularized and objective
justification.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/htm...6_0544_ZS.html
446 U.S. 544: United States v. Mendenhall
-
-
Self
Defense / Resisting Arrest / Helping others who
are being arrested
-
“When a person, being without fault, is
in a place where he has a right to be, is violently
assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel by
force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his
right of self defense, his assailant is killed, he
is justified.” Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80; Miller
v. State, 74 Ind. 1.
-
“These principles apply as well to an
officer attempting to make an arrest, who abuses his
authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the
use of unnecessary force and violence, as they do to
a private individual who unlawfully uses such force
and violence.” Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. I;
Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex. App. 1 75; Skidmore v.
State, 43 Tex. 93, 903.
-
“Each person has the right to resist an
unlawful arrest. In such a case, the person
attempting the arrest stands in the position of a
wrongdoer and may be resisted by the use of force,
as in self- defense.” (State v. Mobley, 240 N.C.
476, 83 S.E. 2d 100).
-
“One may come to the aid of another being
unlawfully arrested, just as he may where one is
being assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus
it is not an offense to liberate one from the
unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may
have submitted to such custody, without resistance.”
(Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 910).
-
From Mutiny on the Amistad by Howard
Jones, Oxford University Press, 1987, an account of
the reading of the decision in the case by Justice
Joseph Story of the Supreme Court “Story affirmed
the right of self-defense by persons held illegally.
In his own writings, he had admitted that ‘a
situation could arise in which the
checks-and-balances principle ceased to work and the
various branches of government concurred in a gross
usurpation.’ There would be no usual remedy by
changing the law or passing an amendment to the
Constitution, should the oppressed party be a
minority. Story concluded, ‘If there be any remedy
at all ... it is a remedy never provided for by
human institutions.’ That was the ‘ultimate right of
all human beings in extreme cases to resist
oppression, and to apply force against ruinous
injustice.’”
-
"The usual rule is that a police officer
may arrest without warrant one believed by the
officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of
a felony , and that he may only arrest without a
warrant one guilty of a misdemeanor if committed in
his presence. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 US 487; Elk v.
U.S., 117 US 529.
-
"The offense of resisting arrest, both
at common law and under statute, presupposes a
lawful arrest. It is axiomatic (self-evident) that
every person has the right to resist an unlawful
arrest. In such case the person attempting the
arrest stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may
be resisted by the use of force, as in
self-defense." [State v. Mobley 240 N.C. 476, 83
S.E. 2D 100,102 (1954)]
-
-
Being
detained /Seizures of a “person”
-
"When officers detained defendant for
the purpose of requiring him to identify himself,
they performed a "seizure" of his person subject to
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." [Brown v.
Texas, 443 US at 47]
-
"It must be recognized that whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person." [Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 16 (1968)]
-
"The Fourth Amendment, of course,
applies to all seizures of the person, including
seizures that involve only a brief detention short
of traditional arrest." Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 16-19
(1968).
-
"Whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away,
he has `seized' that person," id. at 16 , and the
Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be
"reasonable." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975)
-
-
Color
of Law abuses
-
The
FBI is the lead federal agency for
investigating color of law abuses, which
include acts carried out by government
officials operating both within and beyond the
limits of their lawful authority. Off-duty
conduct may be covered if the perpetrator
asserted his or her official status in some
way. To file a color of law complaint, contact
your local FBI office by telephone, in
writing, or in person.
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investig...w/color-of-law
Reply With Quote
-
Taking
of property
-
Under
USC Title 42 §1982. Property rights of
citizens …, further evidences the above
position that the City or State cannot take
land because they DO NOT have Jurisdiction. It
states that federal or state governments /
agencies MUST have a monetary or proprietary
interest in your real private property in
order to have jurisdiction over it (if your
land has no government grant/funding or is not
a subsidized government project, then agencies
have neither). DEMAND any public servant/said
agencies to provide the legal document that
allows any federal or state agency to
supercede and/or bypass Title 42 USC §1982
and/or §1441. Title 42 §1983. Civil action for
deprivation of rights …, further protects
Declarant’s private property.
-
Contracts
-
"Party
cannot be bound by contract that he has not
made or authorized." Alexander v. Bosworth
(1915), 26 C.A. 589, 599, 147 P.607.
-
Ignorance
of the law (or claiming thereof by a public
offical)
-
"Ignorance of the law does not excuse
misconduct in anyone, least of all in a sworn
officer of the law." In re McCowan (1917), 177 C.
93, 170 P. 1100.
-
"It is one of the fundamental maxims of
the common law that ignorance of the law excuses no
one." Daniels v. Dean (1905), 2 C.A. 421, 84 P. 332.
-
"All are presumed to know the law." San
Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel (1882), 62 C. 641;
Dore v. Southern Pacific Co. (1912), 163 C. 182, 124
P. 817; People v. Flanagan (1924), 65 C.A. 268, 223
P. 1014; Lincoln v. Superior Court (1928), 95 C.A.
35, 271 P. 1107; San Francisco Realty Co. v. Linnard
(1929), 98 C.A. 33, 276 P. 368.
-
“Selective prosecution when referring to
the decision to prosecute in retaliation for the
exercise of a constitutional right gives rise to an
actionable right under the constitution." County of
Kenosha v. C. & S. Management, Inc. 223 Wis. 2d
373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999), 97−0642
-
"Qualified immunity defense fails if
public officer violates clearly established right
because a reasonably competent official should know
the law governing his conduct" Jones vs Counce
7-F3d-1359-8th Cir 1993; Benitez v Wolff 985-F3d 662
2nd Cir 1993
-
-
Being
a witness against yourself 5th
Amendment
-
"The Fifth Amendment provides that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution
but also privileges him not to answer official
questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil
or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers
might incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings." [Lefkowitz v. Turley, 94 S. CT. 316,
414 U.S. 70 (1973)]
-
"The privilege is not ordinarily
dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which
the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies
alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever
this might tend to subject to criminal
responsibility on him who gives it. The privilege
protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who
is a party defendant." [McCarthy v. Arnstein, 266
U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.CT. 16, 17, 69 L.ED. 158 (1924)]
-
"where the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is involved the court has
always construed its protection to ensure that an
individual is not compelled to produce evidence
which later may be used against him as an accused in
a criminal action The protection does not merely
encompass evidence which may lead to criminal
conviction, but includes information which would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could
lead to prosecution, as well as evidence which an
individual reasonably believes could be used against
him in a criminal prosecution." [Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.CT.814, 95L.Ed. 1,
18 (1951)]
-
"in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 92 S. CT. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 212(1972), we
recently reaffirmed the principle that the privilege
against self-incrimination can be asserted in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or
judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory. Id., at
444, 92 S. Ct. AT 1656; “ [Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 94 S. CT.316, 322, 38 L. Ed. 274 (1973)]
-
". . .there can be no doubt that the
Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect
persons in all settings in which their freedom of
action is curtailed in any significant way from
being compelled to incriminate themselves." [Miranda
v. Arizona, 86 S. CT. 1602, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ]
[McCarthy v. Arnstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.CT. 16,
17, 69 L.ED. 158 (1924)]
-
Definition
of consumer goods versus equipment
-
"The
use to which an item is put, rather than its
physical characteristics, determine whether it
should be classified as ``consumer goods''
under UCC 9-109(1) or ``equipment'' under UCC
9-109(2)." Grimes v Massey Ferguson, Inc., 23
UCC Rep Serv 655; 355 So.2d 338 (Ala., 1978).
-
Protectiong
property
-
"Right
of protecting property, declared inalienable
by constitution, is not mere right to protect
it by individual force, but right to protect
it by law of land, and force of body politic."
Billings v. Hall (1857), 7 C. 1.
-
Public
Officials over reaching their “power”
-
"Nothing is gained in the argument by
calling it ‘police power.’” Henderson v. City of New
York, 92 U.S. 259, 2771 (1875);
-
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 501 (1934).
"An officer who acts in violation of the
Constitution ceases to represent the government."
Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F.Supp. 94.
-
Failure to obey the command of a police
officer constitutes a traditional form of breach of
the peace. Obviously, however, one cannot be
punished for failing to obey the command of an
officer if that command is itself violative of the
constitution. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284,
291-2.
-
That an officer or employee of a state
or one of its subdivisions is deemed to be acting
under "color of law" as to those deprivations of
right committed in the fulfillment of the tasks and
obligations assigned to him. Monroe v. Page, 1961,
365 U.S. 167. (Civil law)
-
Actions by state officers and employees,
even if unauthorized or in excess of authority, can
be actions under "color of law." Stringer v. Dilger,
1963, Ca. 10 Colo., 313 F.2d 536. (Civil law)
-
"The police power of the state must be
exercised in subordination to the provisions of the
U.S. Constitution." Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245 US 60;
-
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State
Highway Commission, 294 US 613. "With regard
particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is
elementary that a Right secured or protected by that
document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any
state police authority."
-
Donnolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A.
848; O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A.
887. When officers detained appellant for the
purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they
performed a seizure of his person subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment... The Fourth
Amendment, of course, applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief
detention short of traditional arrest... Whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the
seizure be 'reasonable'. * "But even assuming that
purpose (prevention of crime) is served to some
degree by stopping and demanding identification from
an individual without any specific basis for
believing he is involved in criminal activity, the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it."
-
"The application of...(a code)...to
detain appellant and require him to identify himself
violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers
lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant
was engaged, or had engaged, in criminal conduct.
Accordingly, appellant may not be punished for
refusing to identify himself, and the conviction is
reversed." (Probable cause) Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, (1979) *
-
"Traffic infractions are not a crime."
People v. Battle
-
"To this end, the Fourth Amendment
requires that a seizure must be based on specific
objective facts indicating that society's legitimate
interests require the seizure of the particular
individual, or that the seizure must be carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual
officers."Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648
-
"The officers of the law, in the
execution of process, are required to know the
requirements of the law, and if they mistake them,
whether through ignorance or design, and anyone is
harmed by their error, they must respond in
damages." Roger v. Marshall (United States use of
Rogers v. Conklin), 1 Wall. (US) 644, 17 Led 714.
-
"It is a general rule that an officer,
executive, administrative, quasi-judicial,
ministerial, or otherwise, who acts outside the
scope of his jurisdiction, and without authorization
of law may thereby render himself amenable to
personal liability in a civil suit." Cooper v.
O`Conner, 69 App DC 100, 99 F (2d)
-
"Public officials are not immune from
suit when they transcend their lawful authority by
invading constitutional rights. "AFLCIO v. Woodard,
406 F 2d 137 t.
-
"Immunity fosters neglect and breeds
irresponsibility while liability promotes care and
caution, which caution and care is owed by the
government to its people." (Civil Rights) Rabon vs
Rowen Memorial Hospital, Inc. 269 N.S. 1, 13, 152 SE
1 d 485, 493.
-
Government Immunity - “In Land v.
Dollar, 338 US 731 (1947), the court noted, “that
when the government entered into a commercial field
of activity, it left immunity behind.”
-
Brady v. Roosevelt, 317 US 575 (1943);
FHA v. Burr, 309 US 242 (1940); Kiefer v. RFC, 306
US 381 (1939). The high Courts, through their
citations of authority, have frequently declared,
that “...where any state proceeds against a private
individual in a judicial forum it is well settled
that the state, county, municipality, etc. waives
any immunity to counters, cross claims and
complaints, by direct or collateral means regarding
the matters involved.” Luckenback v. The Thekla, 295
F 1020, 226 Us 328; Lyders v. Lund, 32 F2d 308;
-
“When enforcing mere statutes, judges of
all courts do not act judicially (and thus are not
protected by “qualified” or “limited immunity,” -
SEE: Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662; Bothke v. Terry,
713 F2d 1404) - - “but merely act as an extension as
an agent for the involved agency -- but only in a
“ministerial” and not a “discretionary capacity...”
Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v.
P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464.
-
Judges
acting outside their jurisdiction
-
Immunity for judges does not extend to
acts which are clearly outside of their
jurisdiction. Bauers v. Heisel, C.A. N.J. 1966, 361
F.2d 581, Cert. Den. 87 S.Ct. 1367, 386 U.S. 1021,
18 L.Ed. 2d 457 (see also Muller v. Wachtel,
D.C.N.Y. 1972, 345 F.Supp. 160; Rhodes v. Houston,
D.C. Nebr. 1962, 202 F.Supp. 624 affirmed 309 F.2d
959, Cert. den 83 St. 724, 372 U.S. 909, 9 L.Ed.
719, Cert. Den 83 S.Ct. 1282, 383 U.S. 971, 16 L.Ed.
2nd 311, Motion denied 285 F.Supp. 546).
-
"Judges not only can be sued over their
official acts, but could be held liable for
injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's
fees." Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.
-
"The immunity of judges for acts within
their judicial role is beyond cavil." Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1957).
-
"There is no common law judicial
immunity." Pulliam v. Allen, 104S.Ct. 1970; cited in
Lezama v. Justice Court, A025829.
-
"Judge acted in the face of clearly
valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him
of (personal) jurisdiction would be liable." Dykes
v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488 (1984). "In such case the
judge has lost his judicial function, has become a
mere private person, and is liable as a trespasser
for damages resulting from his unauthorized acts."
-
Jurisdiction
-
"Where there is no jurisdiction there is
no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Such has
been the law from the days of the Marshalsea, 10
Coke 68; also Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335,351."
Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948.
-
Juvenile
Rights
Title
42, U.S.C., Section 14141 Pattern and Practice
This civil
statute was a provision within the Crime Control Act of
1994 and
makes it unlawful for any governmental authority, or
agent thereof,
or any person acting on behalf of a governmental
authority, to engage
in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement
officers or by
officials or employees of any governmental agency with
responsibility
for the administration of juvenile justice or the
incarceration of
juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges,
or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United
States.
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to
believe that a violation has occurred, the Attorney
General, for or
in the name of the United States, may in a civil action
obtain
appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to
eliminate the pattern
or practice.
Types of misconduct covered include, among other
things:
1.
Excessive Force
2.
Discriminatory Harassment
3.
False Arrest
4.
Coercive Sexual Conduct
5.
Unlawful Stops, Searches, or Arrests
-
Infringing
on constitutional rights
-
"Constitutional rights may not be
infringed simply because the majority of the people
choose that they be." Westbrook v. Mihaly 2 C3d 756
-
"Government may not prohibit or control
the conduct of a person for reasons that infringe
upon constitutionally guaranteed freedoms." Smith v.
U.S. 502 F2d 512 CA Tex (1974)
-
"We find it intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another." Simmons v. US, 390 US
389 (1968)
-
"When any court violates the clean and
unambiguous language of the constitution, a fraud is
perpetrated and no one is bound to obey it." State
v. Sutton 63 Minn 167, 65 NW 262, 30 LRA 630
-
"...good faith is not enough to
constitute probable cause. That faith must be
grounded on facts within knowledge of the...agent,
which in the judgment of the court would make his
faith reasonable." Director General v Kastenbaum,
263 U.S. 25.
-
"Constitutional rights may not be denied
simply because of hostility to their assertion and
exercise. Vindication of conceded constitutional
rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that
it is less expensive to deny them than to afford
them." Watson v Memphis, 375 U.S. 526.
-
Title 18 United States Code, Section
241, provides that... "any person who goes on the
highway in disguise to prevent or hinder the free
exercise and enjoyment of any right so secured by
law...shall be fined not more than $10,000.00 or
imprisoned not more than ten years or both."
Further, Title 18, United States Code, Section 242,
provides for one or more persons who, under color of
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any state,
territory, or district to the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution, or laws of the United States... shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year or both. Title 18, United States Code,
Section 242, with its color of law provision, gives
a cause of action to apply Title 18, United States
Code, Section 241, because Section 241 needs two
persons in disguise and Section 242 provides the
second person under color of law as the "QUASI
SUMMONS" mentioned herein implies that a judge in
the Municipal Court is acting in concert to commit
an overt act of fraud and extortion for conversion.
Further, United States Code, Title 18, section 242
provides for one or more persons who, under color of
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any state,
territory, or district to the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States. . .
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year or both. Usually, it can be
phrased something like: "Demand is upon you to
withdraw the invalid Notice #_____ within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Notice and Demand or
Action will commence in the United States District
Court pursuant to Rule 7(a) and (c) of the criminal
rules of procedure by the jurisdiction provided in
Title 42, United States Code, sections 1983 and
1985; Title 28, U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1343 and
others with Title 18, U.S.C., sections 241, 242,
872, 1621, 1622, and 1623 providing for the
administration of the penalties."
-
"We find it intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another." Simmons v. US, 390 US
389 (1968)
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